Turkey's 2017 Constitutional Amendment: Power Consolidation and Judicial Politicization

Turkey's 2017 Constitutional Amendment: Power Consolidation and Judicial Politicization

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Turkey's 2017 Constitutional Amendment: Power Consolidation and Judicial Politicization

Istanbul Bar Association head Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Kaboglu asserts that Turkey's 2017 constitutional amendment, for the first time in the Republic's history, combined executive, legislative, and judicial powers in one person, the President who also leads the ruling party, causing unchecked influence on the judiciary and raising concerns about future constitutional changes.

Turkish
Turkey
PoliticsJusticeHuman RightsTurkeyRule Of LawJudiciaryConstitutional Changes
Istanbul Bar AssociationAkp (Ak Parti)
İbrahim Kaboğlu
What are the immediate consequences of Turkey's 2017 constitutional changes on the balance of power among state branches?
In Turkey's 2017 constitutional amendment, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches were combined under one person—the President, who also became the ruling party's leader, directly influencing the judiciary.
What are the potential future implications of the '2017 construct' on Turkey's political system and its citizens' freedoms?
Concerns exist regarding potential future constitutional changes aimed at perpetuating this '2017 construct'. The ongoing erosion of checks and balances and the potential for further restrictions on freedoms necessitate vigilance against any such attempts.
How did the dual role of the president as head of state and ruling party leader affect the independence of the judiciary in Turkey?
This concentration of power, termed the '2017 construct', led to the President's pronouncements impacting the legislature and judiciary, bypassing established legal processes. The resulting politicization of the judiciary is seen as an unavoidable consequence of this structure.

Cognitive Concepts

4/5

Framing Bias

The narrative strongly emphasizes the negative consequences of the 2017 constitutional amendment, framing it as the primary cause of the judiciary's politicization. Kaboglu's statements, which are presented prominently, heavily influence the reader's perception. The use of terms like '2017 kurgusu' (2017 construct) further strengthens this negative framing, portraying the amendment as an artificial and manipulative construct rather than a legitimate legislative act. The headline (if any) would likely reinforce this negative framing.

4/5

Language Bias

The text uses loaded language such as 'otoriter düzenleme' (authoritarian regulation), 'iktidar fetişizmi' (power fetishism), and 'anayasasızlaştırma süreci' (process of unconstitutionalization). These terms carry strong negative connotations and contribute to a biased portrayal of the situation. More neutral alternatives could include terms like 'centralized governance,' 'strong executive power,' and 'changes to constitutional norms.' The repetitive use of '2017 kurgusu' (2017 construct) creates a negative framing.

3/5

Bias by Omission

The provided text focuses heavily on the criticisms of Istanbul Bar Association President Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Kaboglu regarding the 2017 constitutional amendment and its impact on the judiciary. While it mentions the amendment's content, it lacks counterarguments or perspectives from those who support the changes. Omitting these perspectives could create an unbalanced understanding of the situation. The analysis also does not explore potential unintended consequences or positive effects of the amendment, which could be relevant to a complete picture. Furthermore, the article lacks specific examples of judicial decisions directly influenced by the president's statements, which could strengthen the argument of political influence.

3/5

False Dichotomy

The text presents a dichotomy between the pre-2017 system and the post-2017 system, portraying the latter as authoritarian and undermining the independence of the judiciary. It does not explore the possibility of a nuanced interpretation or alternative solutions that might address concerns without discarding the entire post-2017 structure. The framing heavily implies that there is only one cause for the issues, that being the 2017 amendments, ignoring alternative contributing factors.

Sustainable Development Goals

Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions Negative
Direct Relevance

The article highlights the 2017 constitutional amendment in Turkey, which led to the concentration of power in the hands of one person, blurring the lines between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This has resulted in the politicization of the judiciary, undermining its independence and impartiality, and eroding the principles of checks and balances crucial for a just and strong institutional framework. The quotes emphasize concerns about the lack of accountability, the influence of political directives on judicial processes, and the potential for further constitutional changes that would solidify this system. These developments directly contradict SDG 16, which aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.