295 Billion Rubles Lost to Fraud in Russian Messaging Apps in 2025

295 Billion Rubles Lost to Fraud in Russian Messaging Apps in 2025

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295 Billion Rubles Lost to Fraud in Russian Messaging Apps in 2025

In 2025, 295 billion rubles were lost to fraud in Russia, with 40% allegedly funding Ukraine; 76,000 cases were reported (51,000 in Telegram, 24,000 in WhatsApp), alongside increased illegal activities; Meta's lack of cooperation exacerbates this.

Russian
PoliticsRussiaNational SecurityCybersecurityDisinformationWhatsappOnline FraudTelegram
Meta*TelegramSberMinistry Of Internal Affairs (Mvd) Of RussiaCouncil For Human Rights Under The President Of RussiaRoskomnadzor
Alexander Malkevich
What are the immediate financial and security implications of the widespread fraud occurring in WhatsApp and Telegram?
In 2025, Russian citizens lost 295 billion rubles to fraud, with 40% allegedly funding Ukrainian forces. This involved 76,000 fraud cases, 51,000 in Telegram and 24,000 in WhatsApp. Illegal activities like drug and pornography distribution also significantly increased within these platforms.
How do the features of WhatsApp and Telegram facilitate criminal activities, and how effective are current government measures in combating these?
The anonymity and lack of verification in WhatsApp and Telegram facilitate fraud. Criminals exploit this using deepfakes, malware, and psychological manipulation, targeting vulnerable groups like the elderly and children. This is compounded by Meta's (WhatsApp's owner) poor response to Russian authorities' requests to remove illegal content.
What are the long-term societal and national security risks associated with the lack of regulation and cooperation from foreign messaging apps, and what alternative solutions are proposed?
The situation demands a multi-pronged approach: stricter regulations on messaging apps, increased user awareness, and promoting the use of domestic alternatives. Failure to address these issues will result in continued financial losses, social disruption, and national security risks. The lack of cooperation from foreign platforms exacerbates the problem.

Cognitive Concepts

4/5

Framing Bias

The article uses alarming statistics and emotionally charged language to frame foreign messaging apps as inherently dangerous. The headline and introduction immediately highlight the dangers and potential financial losses associated with these platforms, setting a negative tone that persists throughout the piece. The inclusion of anecdotes about scams targeting vulnerable groups further reinforces this negative framing. The article is structured to emphasize the negative consequences, downplaying the positives and leaving the reader with a sense of unease and a predisposition towards the proposed solutions. The use of phrases like "war on the invisible front" adds to this hyperbolic tone.

4/5

Language Bias

The article uses highly charged and emotionally loaded language, such as "plundering", "hooked on a needle", "debt bondage", "psychological pressure", and "mass company of psychological pressure and misinformation". These phrases evoke strong negative emotions and contribute to a sense of alarm and fear. Neutral alternatives could include terms such as "scams", "drug use", "financial exploitation", "online harassment", and "deceptive tactics". The frequent use of sensationalized language biases the reader towards a negative perception of the discussed platforms.

4/5

Bias by Omission

The article focuses heavily on the negative aspects of WhatsApp and Telegram, particularly concerning scams and illegal activities. While it mentions the convenience and usefulness of these messengers, it omits discussion of the positive aspects or the measures these platforms might be taking to combat the issues raised. This omission creates a skewed perspective, potentially leading readers to overestimate the prevalence of these problems and underestimate the platforms' efforts to mitigate risks. It also omits discussion of other messaging platforms.

3/5

False Dichotomy

The article presents a false dichotomy by framing the choice between convenience and security as mutually exclusive. It suggests that using Russian alternatives is the only way to ensure safety, ignoring the possibility of improving security measures within existing platforms or finding a balance between convenience and risk mitigation. The article does not explore the option of utilizing security features within existing platforms as an alternative to completely abandoning them.

3/5

Gender Bias

The article uses gendered stereotypes to illustrate the victims of scams. It specifically mentions "careful Russian grandmothers" being targeted on WhatsApp, while portraying teenagers as victims of exploitation on Telegram. This reinforces harmful stereotypes and doesn't represent the diverse range of users who fall victim to these schemes, irrespective of age and gender. The examples provided serve to further the negative framing of the platforms by selecting examples that would emotionally resonate with readers, potentially regardless of demographic.

Sustainable Development Goals

Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions Negative
Direct Relevance

The article highlights the significant issue of cybercrime facilitated through foreign messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram. These platforms are used for various illegal activities, including fraud, drug trafficking, and the spread of disinformation, undermining peace, justice, and safe online environments. The lack of adequate response from these platforms to regulatory requests further exacerbates this negative impact.